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as its control taxonomy [21]. Although brain security and privacy
scholars have identified many privacy controls for the brain, there
has yet to be an inventory of theoretical and implemented
neuroprivacy controls that are classified into privacy control
families. This study found that few privacy controls have moved
beyond their theoretical formulations and that no open source
solutions exist for individuals wanting to protect themselves from
brain hackers. A novel classification and inventory of BCI privacy
controls is offered, along with discussion of research gaps in
developing compensating controls for neuroprivacy risk.

ABSTRACT
Brain-Computer Interfaces (BCIs) facilitate communication
between brains and computers. As these devices become
increasingly popular outside of the medical context, research
interest in brain privacy risks and countermeasures has bloomed.
Several neuroprivacy threats have been identified in the literature,
including brain malware, personal data being contained in
collected brainwaves and the inadequacy of legal regimes with
regards to neural data protection. Dozens of controls have been
proposed or implemented for protecting neuroprivacy, although it
has not been immediately apparent what the landscape of
neuroprivacy controls consists of. This paper inventories the
implemented and proposed neuroprivacy risk mitigation
techniques from open source repositories, BCI providers and the
academic literature. These controls are mapped to the Hoepman
privacy strategies and their implementation status is described.
Several research directions for ensuring the protection of
neuroprivacy are identified.

Brain-Computer Interfaces (BCIs) are devices that enable
bidirectional or unidirectional communication between brains and
computers [33]. These devices may or may not be additionally
classifiable as neuroprosthetics depending on whether they are
integrated into the neural circuitry of the organism [19].
Applications of BCIs range from diagnosing diseases and
restoring bodily functions to remotely controlling robots, lie
detection, authentication and gaming, among others [33].
Electroencephalography (EEG) is a low-cost and non-invasive
method for obtaining neural data, in use by various consumer BCI
headset providers such as Muse, NeuroSky and Emotiv. Various
other methods for obtaining neural data as well as methods for
stimulating the brain with BCIs were discussed in [4].
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Brain-computer interfaces can be classified according to the
direction(s) communication flows – BCIs can record from the
brain, stimulate the brain or both record from and stimulate the
brain [33]. These interfaces can also be ranked according to their
invasiveness in relation to the brain – invasive BCIs are situated
within the brain, semi-invasive BCIs on the brain surface or
nerves and non-invasive BCIs outside of the skin of the head and
skull [33]. A design classification for BCIs – between passive,
active, reactive and hybrid – also exists, which makes distinctions
according to whether the initiator of the neural data acquisition is
the device or the person and the nature of their interaction [4]. A
novel five-phase BCI cycle was proposed that explains the highlevel signal processing steps involved with neural data acquisition
and neural stimulation, which is useful for neurosecurity threat
modeling [4].

Data

1. INTRODUCTION
Privacy concerns have come to the fore of public consciousness in
recent years, with strict privacy regulations such as the California
Consumer Privacy Act and the European Union’s General Data
Protection Regulation making headlines and privacy controversies
such as the Snowden revelations and Facebook’s Cambridge
Analytica scandal roiling popular trust in government and
commercial institutions. In recent decades, researchers have
shown heightened interest in anticipating and documenting
privacy threats to the human brain and mind involving the use of
Brain-Computer Interfaces (BCIs). There is much discussion of
neurosecurity and neuroprivacy risks and controls, although it is
unclear what is being done to develop and make widely available
privacy controls for protecting the privacy of people who utilize
BCIs.

Privacy is difficult to define, but at a high level can be thought of
as “the relief from a range of kinds of social friction” [35].
Adapting this definition to BCIs, neuroprivacy can be thought of
as relief from social friction stemming from the processing of
neural data. The original neuroprivacy article defined
neuroprivacy as privacy concerns of neurodiagnostic and
neuroimaging techniques [31]. “Privacy of thoughts and feelings”
has been identified as one of the seven types of privacy, inspired
by the privacy issues of neurotechnology [17]. Another author has
identified issues related to BCI-enabled blackmail and decisional
interference (loss of autonomy), which are privacy harms within
Solove’s taxonomy [23]. Since insecurity is a privacy harm,
neurosecurity issues that result in social friction for the data
subject can also be thought of as neuroprivacy issues.

This paper seeks to summarize the current state of neuroprivacy
controls implementation, utilizing the Hoepman privacy strategies
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Neuroprivacy concerns represent a unique and pressing challenge
for privacy professionals as the mind becomes ever more
connected and discernible with advances in neurotechnology.
There is uncertainty as to whether data protection regimes can
adequately address neuroprivacy concerns [20], and other scholars
have identified a lack of basic privacy protections such as
applications having excessive access to personal information in
popular BCI headsets [39]. There was one application that sent
users’ raw EEG data to cloud storage, potentially allowing
unknown parties to extract sensitive personal information from
users’ brainwaves at some point in the future. Obtaining informed
consent from the users of BCIs is particularly difficult due to
previously collected EEG data having the potential to later be
processed in novel ways that allows extraction of information that
was not possible before due to advancements in the methods used
to process EEG signals [37]. The neural data extracted with BCIs
is inherently personal – each person’s brainwaves are unique [37]
and change little over their lifetime [14] and may contain sensitive
information such as religiosity [25], drowsiness levels [40] and
“guilty knowledge” [33], among other aspects of cognition.

empowering the data subject, whereas Demonstrate and Enforce
focus on the role of the data controller in maintaining privacy
protections.
The existing brain hacking literature identifies numerous privacy
and security controls that could be deployed to mitigate risks
related to the use of BCI technology. However, these controls
have not been organized under a privacy control taxonomy such
as the Hoepman strategies. The rest of this paper is as follows:
Section 2 discusses the methodology for inventorying the
neuroprivacy controls; Section 3 contains the results; Section 4
discusses the results, while concluding remarks are in Section 5.

2. METHODOLOGY
For a piece of research to be included in this inventory, it had to
contain at least one concrete, specific action an individual or
organization could take to protect neuroprivacy; be from an
academic database; be available for reading, either through library
subscriptions or be openly available for download; and be readily
traceable from the neurosecurity and neuroprivacy literature or
from searches for relevant keywords in the titles of the articles.
Only controls mentioned within the context of BCIs were
included in the inventory – the neuroprosthetics literature was not
included, such as the neurosecurity controls mentioned in [19].

The original neurosecurity paper defined neurosecurity as “the
protection of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of neural
devices from malicious parties with the goal of preserving the
safety of a person’s neural mechanisms, neural computation, and
free will” [13]. Another researcher has proposed the term
“neurocrime” to refer to criminal activities that involve neural
information [23]. “Brain spyware” has been demonstrated in the
lab, illustrating that brain hackers can deduce private information
such as banking information, recognized faces, PIN numbers,
location of residency and month of birth from the brains of BCI
users by showing them visual stimuli and using a machine
learning model to detect familiar information based on the brain’s
response [28]. This type of attack can also be performed
subliminally, without the conscious awareness of the target [18].
Brain hacking scholars are anticipating the growing significance
and complexity of these privacy and security threats [4], as novel
architectures for neurotechnology enable technology-assisted
telepathy [7], using thoughts to remote-control animals [41] and
the emergence of a global “Internet of Neurons” [34].

Controls were classified into four categories: academic,
commercial, open source and theorized. Academic controls have
been demonstrated in research labs; commercial controls were
countermeasures that were known to be in use by BCI providers;
open source controls were tools that were hosted on openly
available repositories; and theorized controls were those
mentioned in the literature, but had not been implemented in
academia, in industry or by individuals maintaining open source
solutions. For theorized controls, only the earliest citation was
used, and all citations were presented if multiple independent
researchers proposed or implemented the control during the same
year. The Hoepman strategies were loosely interpreted when
possible, which included counting security tools that could be
used to indirectly protect personal data as privacy tools. Security
controls that were not classifiable as Hoepman controls were
given a “Non-Hoepman” security control designation. The
Smartphone Brain Scanner openPDS system described in [37] was
accounted for as a collection of separate, constituent privacy
controls rather than one large privacy control that spanned
multiple Hoepman tactics and families.

Hoepman distilled the privacy design literature into eight distinct
kinds of strategies made up of 26 tactics, which address various
high-level requirements of data protection regulation [10, 11, 21,
22]. His privacy design strategies and tactics have been proposed
as a potential control taxonomy for mitigating privacy risks [11].
Although intended to categorize privacy design patterns,
Hoepman envisioned that his taxonomy could be used to analyze
the privacy impact of information systems more generally [21],
suggesting that it is an appropriate framework for understanding
neuroprivacy risks and controls.

Mentions of security or privacy controls for BCI devices on
certain code repositories and commercial BCI provider websites
were also included in this study. The following BCI provider
domains were searched for security, privacy and data protection in
the context of BCIs or neural data:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

The first four strategies – Minimize, Separate, Abstract and Hide
– are data-oriented strategies, dealing with the architectural
considerations of privacy described in [36]. Architectures that
support less identifiability and less centricity promote stronger
privacy. Identifiability is the ease with which personal data can be
linked to a natural person, while centricity is the degree to which
an organization’s network systems enable control over the data
subject’s information [36]. The tactics within these four strategies
can be thought of as specific techniques for reducing centricity
and identifiability in an organization’s architecture. The remaining
four strategies – Inform, Control, Enforce and Demonstrate – are
process-oriented, or privacy-by-policy, strategies [21]. They are
organizational processes and procedures for promoting strong
privacy [22]. Inform and Control are strategies that focus on

BioSemi (https://www.biosemi.com)
Emotiv (https://www.emotiv.com)
Halo Neuro (https://www.haloneuro.com)
Kokoon (https://kokoon.io)
Muse (https://choosemuse.com)
MyndPlay (https://myndplay.com)
NeuroOptimal (https://neuroptimal.com)
NeuroSky (http://neurosky.com)
OpenBCI (https://openbci.com)

These providers’ privacy policies and other web pages from the
domains listed above were analyzed for any sort of privacy
protections that specifically dealt with neural data or BCI device
privacy protections. Only four of the nine providers listed above
dealt specifically with neuroprivacy issues in their privacy
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notices: Emotiv, Kokoon, Muse and NeuroSky. For NeuroSky,
neural data processing was discussed in the privacy notice of the
Effective Learner App, but not in the main privacy notice. With
regards to all privacy notices, protections that explicitly
generalized to covering all personal data of which EEG data was a
specified type were included in the inventory by default, even if it
was unlikely that those protections applied to neural data. For
instance, a BCI provider that stated that EEG data is personal data
and that they will allow the data subject to correct inaccuracies in
their personal data were classified in the inventory as allowing the
correction of EEG data unless there was an explicit exception for
EEG data. Thus, for the purposes of this paper, all privacy notices
were interpreted literally. In addition to BCI provider websites,
the following code repositories were searched for mention of open
source privacy or security tools that are explicitly for protecting
EEG data or BCI devices:
•
•
•
•
•

context of BCIs. Adversarial training, architecture modifications,
defense distillation and ensemble method are techniques for
hardening machine learning models against exploitation [4].
These techniques would involve protecting the algorithm(s)
responsible for decoding intentions in neural data acquisition and
those responsible for encoding neural firing patterns in
neurostimulators. Other proposed neurosecurity controls included
utilizing robust programming languages, malware visualization
and compilation techniques and options [4].
Academic,
2, 2%

Commercial
, 25, 27%

GitHub (https://github.com)
GitLab (https://gitlab.com)
BitBucket (https://bitbucket.org)
SourceForge (https://sourceforge.net)
LaunchPad (https://launchpad.net)

Open
Source,
1, 1%

3. RESULTS
This section begins with a general overview of the findings,
followed by six subsections describing the controls, sorted by
their Hoepman classifications. In total, 94 neuroprivacy controls
were identified from the literature, BCI provider websites and in
code repositories. Figures 1 through 3 were generated from this
collected data and were designed to answer the following research
questions:
•
•
•

Theorized,
66, 70%

What proportion of neuroprivacy controls have
implementations and what is the relative distribution of
implementation types?
What is the relative control distribution among the eight
Hoepman privacy strategies?
What is the proportion of each control group that has
been implemented?

Figure 1. Distribution of Existing Neuroprivacy Controls by
Type
Security, 7,
8%

Minimize, 12,
13%

Separate, 5,
5%

Figure 1 illustrates the relative distribution of controls based on
whether they were theorized, academic, commercial or open
source. This inventory revealed that most neuroprivacy controls
are theoretical, with 30% in use by BCI providers. There were two
controls, blockchain and Secure Multiparty Computation, that
have been implemented in the lab [1-3]. There was a single open
source solution, Open Brain Consent, which is a template for
obtaining consent from research participants for research that
involves neural data collection [32]. Figure 2 shows the relative
distribution of the 94 controls according to their Hoepman
classifications. There were seven controls that could not be
classified under the Hoepman strategies, so were given the
“Security” designation. The most represented techniques were
those in the Hide and Demonstrate strategies, making up 18% and
22% of the controls respectively. Enforce, Separate and Abstract
were the least represented controls, with five or fewer controls
each. Figure 3 shows the relative distribution of neuroprivacy
controls that have been implemented. Implemented controls were
any controls that were not categorized as theorized. In total, just
under 30% (28) of the 94 controls identified were implemented.
Of the privacy strategies, only the Abstract strategy lacked any
implemented controls, and the Enforce strategy had the highest
proportion of implemented controls (80%).

Demonstrate,
21, 22%

Abstract, 4,
4%

Hide, 17, 18%

Enforce, 5, 5%

Control, 9,
10%
Inform, 14,
15%

Figure 2. Distribution of Controls by Hoepman Strategy

There were seven controls identified that were not classifiable as
Hoepman controls, none of which have been implemented in the
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distributing neural data processing across physical locations
included utilizing an external device for authorizing neural
stimulation [4] and keeping EEG data under the control of the end
user through the use of a locally hosted Personal Data Store (PDS)
[37]. Abstract techniques limit the detail in which personal data is
processed [11]. This strategy had the fewest proposed controls of
any strategy and was the only one that did not have any real-world
implementations. Adding noise to EEG data before applications
can process it could decrease the risk of personal data leaks [28].
Differential privacy is a specific application of noise addition that
could be deployed in BCIs to deidentify brainwaves [39]. Personal
Data Stores could be equipped with capabilities for aggregate
computation of neural data across multiple PDS instances and
summarizing EEG data into high-level attributes by reducing the
dimensionality of the data [37].

100%
90%

1

80%

6

70%
60%
50%

3

11
11

66

4

19

4

40%

4

30%

8

20%
10%
0%

7

6

6

1

1

Implemented

28
2

The Hide strategy reduces the identifiability of personal data and
prevents it from becoming public or known [11]. This strategy
had a total of six implementations, five commercial and one
academic. Emotiv encrypts neural data at rest and in transit [15].
There were two BCI providers that anonymize neural data by
removing any associated identifying information [29, 30]. Emotiv
utilizes pseudonymization, which involves processing neural data
with a unique identifier rather than directly attributing the neural
data to the data subject [15]. NeuroSky, Muse and Kokoon limit
access to neural data based on a “need to know” [26, 29, 30].
Secure Multiparty Computation was demonstrated in the lab to
allow estimation of driver drowsiness without exposing any
individual user’s EEG data [1, 2]. Proposed Hide techniques
included fine-grained context-based access control [27],
maintaining different permission granularity [4] and restricted
APIs [28], all of which could be used to limit access to neural
data. Functional encryption and homomorphic encryption have
been suggested as potential methods for obfuscating raw EEG
data or the extracted features [39]. Application hardening could be
used to make BCI software more difficult to reverse engineer,
increasing the difficulty of brain exploitation [4]. Mix techniques
reduce the risk of unwanted correlation and could include
randomization [39], utilizing mix networks such as The Onion
Router [34] and using spread spectrum for enhanced wireless
security [4]. Mental firewalls and mental encryption are
theoretical controls unique to neuroprivacy. As BCIs are equipped
with advanced brain-to-brain communication capabilities, there
will be a need to protect against “malicious brainwaves,” which
could compromise the integrity of the mind [34]. Restricting
access to the mind or specific parts of the mind could be achieved
with a firewall that is designed to filter brainwaves. Mental
encryption would involve using a person’s cognition as part of an
algorithm for encrypting their brainwaves, although it is unclear
how this would work in practice [34].

Unimplemented

Figure 3. Distribution of Controls by Implementation Status
The Minimize strategy limits as much as possible the processing
of personal data [11]. Of the twelve Minimize controls identified,
only one was implemented: BCI providers stating in their privacy
notices that personal data is retained only as long as necessary,
which presumably applies to neural data as well [26, 29, 30]. A
similar and cheaper control would be deleting neural data
regularly as it becomes unnecessary [6]. Limiting retention of
neural data was not universal among the BCI providers, as Emotiv
explicitly stated in their privacy notice that they retain EEG data
indefinitely [15]. Minimize can also be realized by selectively
choosing what personal data to process or by refusing to process
personal data. The use of directional antennas and low
transmission power could limit the processing of personal data in
physical space [4]. Utilizing whitelists, running apps with lowest
privileges and designing platforms to only have necessary features
are methods for being selective about which neural data will be
processed and limiting the processing to relevant parties and
applications [4]. Methods for not processing certain neural data
included blacklists [4], traffic filtering [34] and input sanitization
and validation [34]. Safe APIs and languages were proposed as a
way to automate input sanitization and validation [4]. Most of the
proposed Minimize controls are familiar from the cybersecurity
field, with the exception of the BCI Anonymizer [5, 9]. This tool
has been proposed as a way to remove private information from
EEG data before they are stored or transmitted [5], although it has
not been invented as suggested by the abandoned status of the
BCI Anonymizer patent application [9]. Several issues with the
BCI Anonymizer idea have been identified, including resource
constraints in BCI devices, lack of access to proprietary
algorithms, lack of a clear method for separating private
information from intentions and a general lack of any
implementation details [39].

The Inform strategy empowers the data subject by informing them
about the processing of their personal data [11]. Inform was the
third most represented Hoepman strategy with 14 controls, of
which eight were implemented. Having a privacy notice that
discusses neuroprivacy concerns can be thought of as the
foundational control in this strategy. The four BCI providers that
mentioned neuroprivacy issues in their privacy notices – Emotiv,
Kokoon, Muse and NeuroSky – each disclose neural data
processing details, inform data subjects of changes to the notice,
and direct data subjects with privacy questions to the proper
contact [15, 26, 29, 30]. Other Inform controls that were present
in BCI provider privacy notices included explaining why neural
data is processed [15, 26, 30] as well as stating that regulators [26,
30] and the data subjects [15, 26, 30] may be notified in the case

Separate involves isolating or distributing the processing of
personal data as much as possible to prevent correlation [11].
Only five Separate controls were identified in this inventory.
Keeping the data subject’s pseudonymization ID separate from
their neural data was the only Separate control with a real-world
implementation [15]. Other proposed techniques for promoting
isolation in BCIs included application sandboxing [34] and
segmented application architectures [4]. Suggestions for
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of a breach. The Open Brain Consent form is an open source
template for a privacy notice and consent form that can be
furnished to research participants whose neural data will be
collected [32]. Researchers have identified a need for using
accessible language in BCI privacy disclosures [6] and explaining
all neural data processing in clear and plain language [37],
although only dedicated research, such as analyzing the reading
difficulty of BCI provider privacy notices, could discern whether
this has been carried out in practice. The data subject could also
receive regular reminders of the status of the neural data
processing that affects them [37]. End user BCI security training
[24], security demos and serious games [24] and subliminal
stimuli awareness [18] have been proposed as controls for
informing the data subject about brain hacking risks and defense.
These measures can be considered Inform controls insofar as they
provide information on how the data subject’s brains could be
manipulated by adversaries, as this manipulation is a form of
neural data processing.

detect and respond to brain malware [4]. An external stimuli
monitor would allow the data subject to review stimuli for
malicious content [4] and “detecting rapid screen changes”
through the use of a subliminal stimuli detector would allow for
the detection and review of malicious subliminal content [18].
Another control that could screen stimuli for malicious content is
code analysis techniques that can determine the legitimacy of any
stimuli presented [38]. Analyzing the physical medium for
exploitation attempts could help thwart jamming attacks [4].
Various other types of detection have been proposed, such as
intrusion detection systems [4], malicious noise detection [24],
inconsistent classification detection [24], machine learning-based
anomaly detection of malware [4] and machine learning-based
inconsistency detection of processing [4]. Feedback mechanisms
for undesired and uninitiated output would allow BCI users to
alert BCI providers, law enforcement or other outside parties to
potential neural tampering or device malfunction, which may be
desirable for sensitive uses of neurotechnology such as
rehabilitation where the risk of physical or psychological harm is
high [24]. Auditing techniques could include periodic
configuration reviews and updates [4], verifying the legitimacy of
BCI software [6] and ensuring a Personal Data Store system
allows for the auditing of neural data access [37]. Tracking neural
data access, usage and flow throughout systems could promote
accountability [27].

Control techniques allow data subjects to control aspects of the
processing of their personal data [11]. The majority of Control
techniques, six of nine, were implemented. The BCI providers had
statements regarding revocation of consent and the rights of the
data subject to access, port and update or correct personal data,
which presumably apply to neural data as well [15, 26, 29, 30].
Kokoon stated that all neural data processing was explicitly opt-in
[26], and all providers besides Emotiv implied that neural data
could be retracted [26, 29, 30]. Proposed controls in this strategy
include easy opt-out mechanisms for data subjects [6], obtaining
informed consent for neural data processing [6] and allowing the
data subject to retain control of their neural data through the use
of a Personal Data Store [37]. Obtaining informed consent was
marked as unimplemented due to the concerns that have been
raised over whether this is theoretically possible for raw EEG data
[37]. The Enforce strategy is concerned with the privacy policy of
the organization [11]. Enforce had the highest percentage of
implemented controls at four of five of those identified. Privacy
notices and privacy policies are two different pieces of
documentation – the former informs the data subject about data
processing [8] and the latter is an internal piece of governance
documentation [12]. Every BCI provider that discussed EEG data
processing in its privacy notice was assumed to have also
implemented an internal privacy policy that covers EEG data
processing to some degree [15, 26, 29, 30]. Other implemented
Enforce controls included ensuring employees comply with the
privacy notice [15], ensuring service providers comply with the
privacy notice [15, 26, 29, 30] and training all employees on
requirements under legal regimes [16]. The privacy addendum
was proposed as a mechanism for managing neuroprivacy risk
associated with third parties such as BCI application developers
[6]. The addendum requires adherence to a set of BCI Privacy
Principles and would be included as a contractual requirement in
various circumstances.

4. DISCUSSION
It was not apparent prior to this study that nearly one hundred
neuroprivacy controls have been discussed or implemented, and
that neuroprivacy controls spanning all eight Hoepman strategies
have been proposed, with at least one real-world implementation
in each control family except for Abstract. There were
unimplemented controls in each of the eight strategies and there
may be many more controls that have not been theorized yet
within each strategy. Implemented controls could be improved by
deploying tools that are purely academic such as Secure
Multiparty Computation [1, 2] and the blockchain platform [3].
As malware and privacy attacks become more severe and
commonplace in the context of BCIs, it is imperative that robust
security and privacy solutions such as intrusion detection systems
and brain antivirus are developed, widely deployed and made
available to all data subjects and BCI providers.
The most difficult controls to actualize may be those in the
Minimize and Abstract strategies, as both control families face
research challenges. Minimize controls such as the BCI
Anonymizer, blacklists and whitelists require being able to make a
distinction between necessary and unnecessary EEG data, with no
proposed methods existing in the literature for making this
distinction. Even if algorithms are developed for classifying
neural data in this way, BCI devices may not be able to support
the control due to BCI resource constraints or BCI providers not
wanting to reveal their proprietary feature extraction algorithms
[39]. Abstract controls that involve adding noise to EEG data,
such as differential privacy, face theoretical challenges. The
accuracy of EEG data may be important to the BCI application in
question, meaning these controls would directly conflict with the
primary functionality of the system [28].

Demonstrate controls involve verifying and showing that personal
data is being processed in compliance with privacy expectations
[11]. It was the most represented Hoepman strategy in this
inventory with 21 unique controls, only two of which have been
implemented: Emotiv conducts internal audits for compliance
with their privacy notice [15] and a blockchain platform that is
capable of detecting violations of EEG data integrity was
demonstrated in the lab [3]. Similar methods for ensuring neural
data integrity could include those familiar from the cybersecurity
field, namely checksums, digital signatures, hash functions and
message authentication codes [34]. Brain antivirus would prevent,

Perhaps one of the hard problems of neuroprivacy is that of
obtaining informed consent for neural data processing.
Adequately informing the data subject about neuroprivacy risks
related to raw EEG data processing may be impossible due to the
complexity of neural data and unforeseen advancements in data
extraction [37]. If obtaining informed consent for raw neural data
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processing is impossible, then perhaps informed consent can only
practically be achieved by alerting the data subject to this
impossibility. A related problem is deciding whether and how to
inform the data subject about brain hacking risks, such as the
possibilities of brain malware and subliminal probing. Providing
such information to users of BCI headsets, although a potentially
disturbing or frightening subject for some, may be important
information for data subjects to consider when making an
informed decision to use a BCI headset. Privacy notices could
limit such discussion to the attacks that have been demonstrated
by researchers, such as those in [18, 28], and include information
about what the BCI provider is doing to prevent, detect and
respond to such brain hacking threats.

within BCI apps to better understand if maintaining neuroprivacy
is challenging from the data subject’s perspective. Additionally,
more clarification is needed regarding what traditional data
protection rights, such as those involving data portability, access
and deletion, consist of in the context of neuroprivacy. The right
to have inaccuracies in one’s personal data corrected is
particularly challenging to conceptualize in the context of neural
data [20]. Dialogues such as these could help spur innovations in
neuroprivacy whilst illuminating the most pressing neuroprivacy
challenges of today.
Preemptively addressing neuroprivacy risks through the
development and deployment of BCI privacy controls is key to
protecting the rights and freedoms of the data subjects. Perhaps
most importantly, it will help avert brain hacking versions of
traumatic privacy violations, such as the Snowden revelations or
Facebook’s Cambridge Analytica scandal, whatever a “neuro”
version of such events would look like. Brain-computer interface
providers, as part of their privacy risk management efforts, will
need neuroprivacy control taxonomies and catalogs to
operationalize privacy protections for their users. Regulators will
need assurance that data protection regimes are being adhered to
with regards to neural data processing, and data subjects will want
assurance that their minds and brains are safe from privacy
violations. This paper inventoried the existing neuroprivacy
controls, serving as a starting point for researchers, BCI
companies, data subjects and regulators to understand what
mechanisms currently exist for mitigating brain privacy risks and
indicated gaps where further innovation and research is necessary.

Secure file deletion for neural data, secure neural data deletion,
could be deployed for decreasing the likelihood of forensic
recovery of neural data from storage devices. Expanding the
current suite of Control techniques could involve allowing the
data subject granular choices regarding the neural data that will be
processed, which could involve allowing the data subject to
customize which personal information contained in their EEG
data they want to share or limiting data acquisition to a specific
time of day, location or context. If a BCI application is a
neurogame whose business model is monetizing the collected
neural data of the players instead of charging a fee to participate,
the application could offer a paid alternative for any privacyconscious users who want to opt out of the monetization of their
brainwaves. A novel Inform control could involve layering the
privacy notice based on the type of personal data under
discussion, with a dedicated section or page for neural data
processing details. Ordering the notice in this manner would allow
concerned data subjects to quickly learn about the neural data
processing practices of the BCI provider without having to
consume the whole privacy notice. Other potential Enforce
controls include pursuing strong neuroprivacy as a strategic goal
for the organization, treating neural data as a business asset and
regularly reviewing the privacy policy for alignment with the
organization’s neuroprivacy strategy.

REFERENCES
[1]

Agarwal, A., Dowsley, R., McKinney, N. D., Wu, D., Lin, C.-T.,
Cock, M. D., & Nascimento, A. (2018). Privacy-preserving linear
regression for brain-computer interface applications. Proceedings of
the IEEE International Conference on Big Data (Big Data), Seattle,
WA. https://doi.org/10.1109/BigData.2018.8621861

[2]

Agarwal, A., Dowsley, R., McKinney, N. D., Wu, D., Lin, C.-T.,
Cock, M. D., & Nascimento, A. (2019). Protecting privacy of users
in brain-computer interface applications. IEEE Transactions on
Neural Systems and Rehabilitation Engineering, 27(8), 1546-1555.
https://doi.org/10.1109/TNSRE.2019.2926965

[3]

Bak, S., Pyo, Y., & Jeong, J. (2019). Protection of EEG data using
blockchain platform. Proceedings of the International Winter
Conference on Brain-Computer Interface (BCI), Gangwon, South
Korea, 1-3. Piscataway, NJ: IEEE. https://doi.org/10.1109/IWWBCI.2019.8737260

[4]

Bernal, S. L., Celdrán, A. H., Pérez, G. M., Barros, M. T.,
Balasubramaniam, S. (2019). Cybersecurity in brain-computer
interfaces: state-of-the-art, opportunities, and future challenges.
ArXiv:1908.03536.

[5]

Bonaci, T., Herron, J., Matlack, C., & Chizeck, H. J. (2014).
Securing the exocortex: A twenty-first century cybernetics
challenge. Proceedings of the 2014 IEEE Conference on Norbert
Wiener in the 21st Century (21CW), Boston, MA.
https://doi.org/10.1109/NORBERT.2014.6893912

[6]

Bonaci, T. (2015). Security and Privacy of Biomedical CyberPhysical Systems. University of Washington, ProQuest Dissertations
and Theses.

[7]

Brigham, K., & Kumar, B. V. K. (2010). Imagined Speech
Classification with EEG Signals for Silent Communication: A
Preliminary Investigation into Synthetic Telepathy. Proceedings of
the International Conference on Bioinformatics and Biomedical
Engineering, Chengdu, China, 1-4. Piscataway, NJ: IEEE.
https://doi.org/10.1109/ICBBE.2010.5515807

5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The future is full of research opportunities for protecting
neuroprivacy, with the majority of controls proposed in the
literature without publicly known implementations. Several future
work possibilities were identified for implementing and
improving upon cybersecurity and privacy solutions for protecting
the brain. Those in charge of neuroprivacy risk management could
benefit from extensive control catalogs, including a vibrant
ecosystem of competing providers and open source solutions
when deciding how to allocate resources for privacy controls.
Brain-computer interface users who want to mitigate their own
neuroprivacy risk could also benefit from a plethora of open
source solutions or paid options. Future work could adapt insights
from various areas of technical privacy – including smartphone
privacy controls, medical device privacy controls and the broader
privacy-enhancing technologies literature – to brainstorm novel
neuroprivacy controls and eventually establish a comprehensive
library of neuroprivacy controls.
More research could be done to evaluate how current BCI
providers handle neuroprivacy risks. For instance, in-depth studies
could be performed to determine whether the reading level of
current BCI privacy notices is accessible to the majority of BCI
users and whether those notices accurately reflect the risks of
neural data processing. Researchers could also investigate the
current usability of neuroprivacy mechanisms such as opt-outs

82

[8]

Cannon, JC. (2014). Privacy in Technology: Standards and
Practices for Engineers and Security and IT Professionals.
Portsmouth, NH: International Association of Privacy Professionals.

[25] Inzlicht, M., McGregor, I., Hirsh, J. B., & Nash, K. (2009). Neural
markers of religious conviction. Psychological Science, 20(3), 385392. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02305.x

[9]

Chizeck, H. J., & Bonaci, T. (2014). U.S. Patent Application No.
14/174,818.

[26] Kokoon.
(2019).
Privacy
https://kokoon.io/policies/privacy-policy

policy.

Kokoon.

[10] Colesky, M., Hoepman, J.-H., & Hillen, C. (2016). A critical
analysis of privacy design strategies. 2016 IEEE Security and
Privacy Workshops (SPW), San Jose, CA, 33-40. Piscataway, NJ:
IEEE. https://doi.org/10.1109/SPW.2016.23

[27] Li, Q., Ding, D., & Conti, M. (2015). Brain-computer interface
applications: Security and privacy challenges. Proceedings of the
2015 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security
(CNS), Florence, Italy. https://doi.org/10.1109/CNS.2015.7346884

[11] Cronk, J. (2018). Strategic privacy by design. Portsmouth, NH:
International Association of Privacy Professionals.

[28] Martinovic, I., Davies, D., Frank, M., Perito, D., Ros, T., & Song, D.
(2012). On the feasibility of side-channel attacks with braincomputer interfaces. Proceedings of the 21st USENIX Security
Symposium,
Bellevue,
WA,
143-158.
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity12/technicalsessions/presentation/martinovic

[12] Dennedy, M. F., Fox J., Finneran, T. (2014). The privacy engineer’s
manifesto: getting from policy to code to QA to value. New York,
NY: Apress
[13] Denning, T., Matsuoka, Y., & Kohno, T. (2009). Neurosecurity:
security and privacy for neural devices. Neurosurgical Focus, 27(1),
E7. https://doi.org/10.3171/2009.4.FOCUS0985

[29] Muse.
(2019,
April
27).
https://choosemuse.com/legal/

Privacy

policy.

muse.

[30] NeuroSky. (2018, May 25). Effective learner privacy policy.
Effective
Learner
Cloud.
https://effectivelearnercloud.com/el/policies/?privacy

[14] Dustman, R. E., Shearer, D. E., & Emmerson, R. Y. (1999). Lifespan changes in EEG spectral amplitude, amplitude variability and
mean frequency. Clinical neurophysiology, 110(8), 1399-1409.
https://doi.org/10.1016/s1388-2457(99)00102-9

[31] The Committee on Science and Law. (2005). Are your thoughts your
own? Neuroprivacy and the legal implications of brain imaging.
New York, NY: New York City Bar Association.

[15] Emotiv. (2018, May 25). EMOTIV privacy policy. EMOTIV.
https://id.emotivcloud.com/eoidc/privacy/privacy_policy/
[16] Emotiv. (2019). Mobile and Secure EEG Cloud Database.
EMOTIV. https://www.emotiv.com/emotiv-eeg-cloud/

[32] Github. (2018, June 27). Open brain consent. Github Blob.
https://github.com/con/open-brainconsent/blob/master/docs/source/ultimate.rst

[17] Finn, R. L., Wright, D., & Friedewald, M. (2013). Seven types of
privacy. European data protection: coming of age, 3-32. Dordrecht:
Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5170-5_1

[33] P.N. Rao, R. (2013). Brain-computer interfacing: an introduction.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[34] Sempreboni, D., & Viganò, L. (2018). Privacy, security and trust in
the internet of neurons. ArXiv:1807.06077.

[18] Frank, M. Hwu, T., Jain, S., Knight, R.T., Martinovic, I., Mittal, P.,
Perito, D., Sluganovic, I., & Song, D. (2017). Using EEG-based BCI
devices to subliminally probe for private information. Proceedings of
the 2017 Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society (WPES’17),
Dallas, TX, 133-136. https://doi.org/10.1145/3139550.3139559

[35] Solove, D. J. (2006). A taxonomy of privacy. University of
Pennsylvania Law Review, 154, 477-560.
[36] Spiekermann, S., & Cranor, L. F. (2009). Engineering privacy. IEEE
Transactions
on
Software
Engineering,
35(1),
67-82.
https://doi.org/10.1109/TSE.2008.88

[19] Gladden, M. E. (2017). The Handbook of Information Security for
Advanced Neuroprosthetics, (2nd ed.). Indianapolis, IN:
Synthypnion Academic.

[37] Stopczynski, A., Greenwood, D., Hansen, L. K., & Pentland, A.
(2014, April 21). Privacy for personal neuroinformatics. SSRN
Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssm.2427564

[20] Hallinan, D., Schütz, P., Friedewald, M., & de Hert, P. (2013).
Neurodata and neuroprivacy: Data protection outdated? Surveillance
& Society 12(1), 55-72. https://doi.org/10.24908/ss.v12i1.4500

[38] Takabi, H. (2016). Firewall for brain: towards a privacy preserving
ecosystem for BCI applications. Proceedings of the 2016 IEEE
Conference on Communications and Network Security (CNS),
Philadelphia, PA. https://doi.org/10.1109/CNS.2016.7860516

[21] Hoepman, J.-H. (2014). Privacy design strategies. Proceedings of the
IFIP International Information Security Conference (SEC),
Marrakech, Morocco. 446-459. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-64255415-5_38

[39] Takabi, H., Bhalotiya, A., & Alohaly, M. (2016). Brain computer
interface (BCI) applications: privacy threats and countermeasures.
Proceedings of the International Conference on Collaboration and
Internet Computing (CIC), Pittsburgh, PA, 102-111. Piscataway, NJ:
IEEE. https://doi.org/10.1109/CIC.2016.026

[22] Hoepman, J.-H. (2019). Privacy design strategies (the little blue
book).
Groningen:
De
Privacy
Coach.
https://www.cs.ru.nl/J.H.Hoepman/publications/pds-booklet.pdf
[23] Ienca, M. (2015). Neuroprivacy, neurosecurity and brain-hacking:
Emerging issues in neural engineering. Bioethica Forum. 8(2), 5153. Schwabe.

[40] Wu, D., Lawhern, V. J., Gordon, S., Lance, B. J., & Lin, C. (2017).
Driver drowsiness estimation from EEG signals using Online
weighted Adaptation Regularization for Regression (OwARR). IEEE
Transactions
on
Fuzzy
Systems,
25(6),
1522-1535.
https://doi.org/10.1109/TFUZZ.2016.2633379

[24] Ienca, M., & Haselager, P. (2016). Hacking the brain: brain–
computer interfacing technology and the ethics of neurosecurity.
Ethics
and
Information
Technology,
18(2),
117-129.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-016-9398-9

[41] Zhang, S., Yuan, S., Huang, L., Zheng, X., Wu, Z., Xu, K., & Pan,
G. (2019). Human mind control of rat cyborg’s continuous
locomotion with wireless brain-to-brain interface. Scientific reports,
9(1), 1-12. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-018-36885-0

83

